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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, citizens’ groups have been unsuccessful in stopping 
legislators from creating their own political dynasties. Through 
manipulation of the redistricting process, legislators and political parties 
can remain in power indefinitely by choosing their own voters at the 
expense of democracy. This has produced uncompetitive elections and 
partisanship. Some states did away with legislative control of 
redistricting and instituted nonpartisan commissions, which have been 
somewhat successful.1 Florida voters enacted the Fair Districts 
Amendments, which aimed to curb redistricting designed protect 
incumbents or a political party. While the Florida Supreme Court and the 
Leon County Circuit Court have invalidated maps designed with 
unlawful intent, these changes haven’t gone far enough to effectuate the 
intent of the voters and allow them to effectively choose their leadership 
in Tallahassee. 
In late 2011 and early 2012, political consultants worked with 
legislators out of the public’s eye to create maps that would protect 
incumbents and the Republican Party. These efforts were captured in 
documents released by the Florida Supreme Court. As an attorney in the 
redistricting cases notes, “the documents reveal in great detail how they 
[political operatives] manipulated the public process to achieve their 
partisan objectives.”2 
                                                                                                         
1 See Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Make Redistricters Accountable to the People, Make 
Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. K. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2010); compare with Peter 
Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, 3 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637 (2013). 
2 See Associated Press, Supreme Court Unseals Documents About Redrawing of 
Florida Districts, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014) http://www.tampabay.com/n
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It would be shortsighted to think that these problems are limited to 
the redistricting process in Florida. But the United States Supreme Court 
has been an ineffective route for pursuing remedies for partisan 
gerrymandering. And political actors will be hesitant to end a practice 
that ensures their political livelihood. Thus, it is up to the American 
public to shift redistricting reform at the state level: through ballot 
initiatives and pressure on legislators. Finally, some measures require 
state courts to enforce the constitutional provisions requiring objectives 
such as compactness. As this note explores, the simple passage of 
redistricting reforms cannot rid the process of its ills while preserving the 
legislature’s primacy in the redistricting process. The great lengths that 
partisan consultants and leaders went to evade the Fair Districts 
Amendment’s requirements show how important the redistricting process 
is and how critical it is to protect Florida voters from gerrymandered 
districts. 
Part I of this note will explore the process of redistricting, its timing, 
tactics, and impacts on Florida and the nation. Part II will explore the 
relevant standards and case law guiding redistricting litigation. Then, 
Part III will explore Florida’s redistricting litigation, before and after the 
passage of the Fair Districts Amendments. Next, Part IV will analyze the 
successes and failures of the Fair Districts Amendments. Finally, Part V 
will explore potential solutions to partisan gerrymandering with a brief 
look at other jurisdictions. 
I. THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS 
Every ten years, the United States Census Bureau is charged with 
tracking changes in the nation’s population, as required by Article I, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.3 This population data is then used to 
determine the allocation of U.S. Representatives and state legislators. 
A. Who Draws the Maps? 
In most states, the duty to redistrict falls upon the legislature.4 In 
most of these jurisdictions, redistricting bills are passed by each house of 
the legislature, reconciled, and sent to the Governor for approval.5 In 
                                                                                                         
ews/politics/supreme-court-unseals-documents-about-redrawing-of-voter-
districts/2207946. 
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
4 See Justin Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 
1, 20 (2010) http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/CGR%20Reprint%
20Single%20Page.pdf. 
5 Levitt, supra note 4. 
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twenty-two states, redistricting commissions have a role in the 
redistricting process.6 Of these states, six use wholly independent 
commissions consisting of individuals who are not public servants, and 
five states implement the commission model only if the legislature fails 
to produce a constitutionally adequate map in time.7 
B. How it Happens 
After the primary redistricting body receives the population data, it 
should move to draw districts of equal or nearly equal population 
according to what are known as “traditional redistricting principles.”8 In 
accordance with such principles, legislators should try to keep 
communities of interest, such as cities, counties, and neighborhoods 
intact.9 The districts should also be compact and contiguous (not 
perforated) whenever possible, and comply with the Voting Rights Act 
and U.S. Constitution. These principles and requirements are central to 
the analysis of Florida’s Fair Districts Amendments. 
Redistricting has a long tradition in American politics. Its much-
maligned cousin, the gerrymander, has endured almost as long.10 Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “gerrymandering” as “the practice of dividing a 
geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, 
to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the 
opposition’s voting strength.”11 In a legislative body, the primary goal 
for a majority party is to increase or preserve the majority. Generally, the 
primary goal for a legislator in redistricting is to get re-elected. These 
goals interact and influence the redistricting process. Even in states 
where the population is equally distributed between the major parties, it 
is possible for the majority party to gerrymander their way to an 
unyielding majority. This can be accomplished in several different ways. 
The tools of packing, cracking, and tacking provide the majority 
party with tools to remain in power. A legislature may want to “pack” or 
                                                                                                         
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 21. 
8 Id. at 40. 
9 What is Redistricting?, REDISTRICTING CALIFORNIA, http://www.redistrictingca
.org/what-is-redistricting. 
10 Around 1812, the term “gerrymander” was coined to refer to a plan by 
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry that would improve the chances of his 
Democratic-Republican Party. One such district took the shape of a salamander. 
Federalists combined the terms into a portmanteau known as “gerrymandering.” 
However, his was not the first recorded instance of gerrymandering. See Emily Barasch, 
The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 
2012) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-history-of-gerrym
andering-in-american-politics/262369/#slide1. 
11 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th pocket ed. 2011). 
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cram the opposing party’s supporters into a few districts.12 This 
guarantees that the opposition will win the district by large margins, but 
the surrounding districts will lose opposition voters, making it easier for 
the majority to win more competitive districts by small margins. In 
contrast, “cracking” involves efforts to split the opposition’s supporters 
so they do not have enough support in a single district to elect a 
representative.13 Finally, the technique of “tacking” refers to the process 
of reaching out from the core of a district to grab friendly voters, or 
include an incumbent’s residence.14 The use of these techniques, often in 
unison, gives the majority party an extra advantage in the elections to 
come. 
Gerrymandering produces a legislative body that is inconsistent with 
the will of the voters. The 2010 elections were critical for the Republican 
Party because they won control of many state legislatures, giving them 
control of the decade’s redistricting process. In 2012, Democrats retained 
the Presidency and gained Senate seats, while Democratic candidates for 
the House of Representatives won more votes than their Republican 
counterparts.15 However, they only won 46% of House seats.16 In swing 
states with Republican legislatures, Democrats won Senate races but 
carried only a fraction of swing-state congressional seats. In 2014, the 
Republican majority won 57% of seats with 47% of the national vote.17 
Barring a wave election, Republicans will control the House of 
Representatives until 2022.18 
In addition to producing inconsistent results, gerrymandering 
produces excessive partisanship. Most districts are uncompetitive during 
general elections, but sometimes have intense primary battles, where 
candidates move closer to ideological extremes to avoid defeat in a 
                                                                                                         
12 Levitt, supra note 4, at 57. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 58. 
15 See Ian Millhiser, Democratic House Candidates Now Have a Nearly 1.2 Million 




17 See Rebecca Ballhaus, Deep Loss by Democrats Obscures Party’s Numbers 
Problem, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014) http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/11/24/loss-
by-democrats-obscures-partys-numbers-problem. 
18 Id. A “wave election” is an election in which one party makes substantial gains and 
has few losses. 2010 was a “wave election” for the Republican Party in 2010, where they 
won an additional 63 House seats and 4 Senate seats. See Wave Election, TAEGAN 
GODDARD’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY (2015) http://politicaldictionary.com/words/wave-
election. 
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primary.19 Because candidates from both parties have moved further 
from the center, Congress has become less productive and unable to 
respond to our nation’s needs.20 
II. SUBSTANTIVE REDISTRICTING LIMITS AND STANDARDS 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Equal Protection Clause 
provide a federal floor in which redistricting plans must meet. Beyond 
these federal limits, states are free to impose additional limits on the 
redistricting process. 
A. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 
The Voting Rights Act was enacted at the apex of the Civil Rights 
movement as a means to ensure that African-Americans and other 
minorities had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the political 
process. Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act apply to the 
redistricting process and require legislators to meet several benchmarks 
to ensure minority representation. Legislative plans must comply with 
these provisions to be valid. 
1. Section 2 Requirements 
Section 2 bans practices that make it more difficult for minority 
voters to “participate in the political process” and to “elect 
representatives of their choice.”21 Most Section 2 challenges involve 
cases of vote dilution, which is the practice of reducing the effectiveness 
of a group’s voting strength by limiting chances to turn that strength into 
voting power.22 In 1982, the Senate amended Section 2 to allow plaintiffs 
to establish a violation if they could prove, based on a totality of the 
circumstances, that the challenged practice had the result of denying the 
racial or language minority the equal opportunity to participate in the 
                                                                                                         
19 As of 2013, only ninety seats in the House of Representatives have a partisan rating 
that falls within five points of the national average. The Cook Partisan Voting Index 
measures how strongly a district leans toward a party, in comparison with the nation as a 
whole. See Hamilton Nolan, Gerrymandering is Eating Democracy, GAWKER (July 29, 
2013) http://gawker.com/gerrymandering-is-eating-democracy-948842710. 
20 See Mark Miller, Congress on Track to be the Least Productive in History, NBC 
NEWS http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/congress-track-be-least-productive-mo
dern-history-n169546 (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
21 Id. 
22 See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 
622 (Fla. 2012) (hereinafter “Apportionment I”). Cracking and packing are common 
techniques to dilute the voting power of minorities. For further discussion on 
Apportionment I, see infra III.E.  
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political process.23 Four years later in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme 
Court held that Section 2 mandated the creation of plans24 used to project 
a minority population if: (1) the minority project has population large 
enough to form a majority in a single district, (2) the minority is 
politically and geographically cohesive to support a single candidate, and 
(3) non-minority voters usually opposite the majority’s preferred 
candidate.25 The satisfaction of the Gingles factors may not be enough in 
itself to prove vote dilution; the Court must look at the totality of the 
circumstances to examine whether the minority vote has been 
unreasonably diluted.26 
2. Section 5 Requirements 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder in 
2013, state legislators in “covered jurisdictions” had to comply with 
Section 5 requirements prohibiting discrimination in voting practices.27 
Section 5 prohibits practices and procedures that have a discriminatory 
effect.28 Under Section 5, a plan has a discriminatory effect under the 
statute if, when compared to the benchmark plan, the submitting 
jurisdiction cannot prove that the plan does not “result in a retrogression 
in the position of racial minorities with the respect to their effective 
                                                                                                         
23 Id. 
24 Such as a majority-minority district. A majority-minority district is a legislative 
district in which more than half of the population of voting age are racial or ethnic 
minorities. See The Role of Section 2- Legal Requirements, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATION FUND, INC., http://redrawingthelines.org/legalrequirements (last visited Apr. 
12, 2015). 
25 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 93 (1986). The Senate listed factors that might 
be probative of a Section 2 violation, including a history of official discrimination, 
racially polarized voting, electoral practices that may enhance discrimination against a 
minority group, a denial of access to a candidate slating process, discrimination in 
education, employment or health which hinders the minority group’s ability to participate 
in the political process, racial appeals in political campaigns, a lack of minority 
candidates elected to public office, a lack of responsiveness to the needs of the minority 
group, and that the policy underlying the use of a voting qualification is tenuous. 
26 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). In Johnson, the Supreme Court 
held that the Florida House’s failure to maximize majority-minority districts was not 
enough to support a finding of vote dilution. The Court held that proportionality or a lack 
of proportionality in electoral results and representation in and of itself cannot prove or 
disprove a case of vote dilution. 
27 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding unconstitutional the 
coverage formula under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act). Prior to Shelby County, 
redistricting procedures and maps in certain covered jurisdictions must be cleared by the 
Justice Department prior to implementation. These jurisdictions had histories of 
discriminating against minority candidates. Without Section 4, Section 5 is 
unenforceable. 
28 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
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exercise of their electoral franchise.”29 A proposed plan is retrogressive if 
its net effect would reduce the effective exercise of the franchise, when 
compared to the benchmark.30 In other words, if the change makes it less 
likely that a protected minority group will be able to elect a 
representative, the plan will be seen to be retrogressive under Section 5 
and would be prohibited from going into effect.31 
B. Racial Redistricting Limitations 
It is not only important to protect minority populations so that they 
can elect representatives, but also important to protect these populations 
from being over-concentrated or packed in only a few districts, in order 
to dilute their influence in other districts. While the Voting Rights Act 
encourages the use of racial performance statistics to guard the ability of 
a minority group to elect candidates, the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Supreme Court’s line of racial gerrymandering cases provide limits to the 
use of race in redistricting. In 1993, the Court held in Shaw v. Reno that 
redistricting based upon racial considerations must be subject to strict 
scrutiny.32 Two years later, the Court invalidated Georgia’s redistricting 
plans designed with the intent of creating a third majority-minority 
district.33 Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause’s ban on the use of 
racial considerations only applies when race is the predominant factor in 
redistricting.34 If political considerations play a role in the redistricting 
process so that race alone is not the predominant factor, than the Equal 
Protection Clause has not been violated.35 In Easley v. Cromartie, the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim because they could 
not prove that racial motives were “dominant and controlling,” and that 
political reasons could explain the packing of African-American voters 
                                                                                                         
29 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 125, 141 (1976). 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Redistricting bodies should be conscious of 
race to the extent that they must comply with Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Shaw held that part of the danger of having seats that were created by a predominantly 
partisan purpose was that representatives would feel like they were beholden to 
mapmakers and certain groups rather than his or her entire constituency. 
33 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 592 (1996) 
(holding that complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was a compelling state 
interest, but Texas’ plan was not narrowly tailored to further such an interest). 
34 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001). 
35 See id. 
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into a “snakelike” district.36 The Supreme Court continues to hear racial 
gerrymandering claims every decade.37 
C. One-Person, One-Vote Requirements 
Redistricting bodies have a duty to ensure that each congressional 
district be equal in population “as nearly as is practicable.”38 Any 
deviation from exact population equality usually must be justified by a 
consistent state policy.39 Even granted a consistent state interest, 
deviations that cause a one percent spread from the most populous 
district to the least populous district will likely be held unconstitutional.40 
When drawing state legislative lines, the redistricting bodies have a little 
more leeway; the districts must only be “substantially equal.”41 
Generally, courts will allow for deviations of up to ten percent; however, 
larger deviations can be justified by compelling reasons, such as 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, while smaller deviations could 
be seen as unacceptable if they are used to further partisan goals.42 
D. Partisan Gerrymandering 
While the Shaw line of racial gerrymandering cases offer a remedy 
for redistricting efforts in which race predominates, there is no justiciable 
federal standard to decide cases in which political interests are the major 
factors in the redistricting efforts. While the Equal Protection Clause 
provided a standard to apply to one-person one vote claims, courts had 
repeatedly refused to weigh in on claims of partisan gerrymandering.43 
In Davis v. Bandemer, Justice White required that plaintiffs prove 
that voters have been “unconstitutionally denied their chance to 
effectively influence the political process.”44 The Court held that the 
                                                                                                         
36 Easley, 532 U.S. at 241-42. 
37 See, e.g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015) 
(holding that Alabama’s redistricting scheme was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander 
because race was the predominant motive in redistricting). 
38 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 367 U.S. 1 (1964). 




42 See id. (comparing Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) with Larios v. Cox, 
300 F. Supp 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three judge court), aff’d sub nom. Cox v. Larios, 542 
U.S. 947 (2004). In Voinovich, the Court upheld the redistricting plan, despite a deviation 
over 10%, because the deviations were necessary to preserve county boundaries. In 
Larios, the Court rejected a plan with 10% deviation, because there were no legitimate 
reasons for such deviation. 
43 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 120 (1986). 
44 Id. at 124. 
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plaintiffs failed to establish a continued inability to influence the political 
process.45 Bandemer effectively foreclosed all political gerrymandering 
claims.46 Courts have been extremely hesitant to intrude upon a 
traditionally legislative function, and generally have deferred to state 
legislatures, even in cases involving the most egregious of 
gerrymandered maps.47 
In 2004, the Supreme Court again took up a political gerrymandering 
case.48 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court rejected a challenge to 
Pennsylvania Republicans’ congressional redistricting scheme that 
allegedly sought to balance out Democratic gains in redistricting in other 
parts of the nation.49 A four-justice plurality held that such claims were 
not justiciable and lacked constitutionally discernable standards of 
review.50 Justice Kennedy concurred in judgment, writing that while such 
a standard might be found in the future, none existed at the time.51 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer wrote separate dissents, arguing that 
such claims were justiciable, but disagreeing on the standard to apply.52 
Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have adopted an approach 
like that adopted in Shaw, holding that plans with a predominant purpose 
to achieve political gain were unconstitutional.53 
Two years later, the Court again declined to step in to invalidate 
another partisan gerrymander in League of United Latin American 
                                                                                                         
45 Davis, 478 U.S. at 124. 
46 See Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially 
Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 248–49 (2009) (explaining that no political gerrymandering 
claims have succeeded after Bandemer). In one case, Ragan v. Vosburgh, No. 96-2621, 
1997 WL 168292, at *6 (4th Cir. 1997) the plaintiffs succeeded on such a claim 
(involving a system of electing judges statewide), but the decision was rendered moot 
after the state legislature adopted a new system of elections. 
47 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 143 (explaining that the Supreme Court does not have a 
long tradition of intervention in redistricting cases); see also Heather K. Gerken, The 
Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and its Progeny, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002). Prior to Baker v. Carr, in 1962, such claims had been 
dismissed as part of the “political question” doctrine, in which it was seen to be desirable 
for courts to stay out of the “political thicket.” Baker, 369 U.S. 186. As many 
commentators have noted, and as the line of political gerrymandering cases describe, the 
courts have not been willing to venture into this “political thicket” in cases of mixed 
motive, or to draw a line in which political gerrymandering would no longer be 
acceptable from an Equal Protection standpoint. Id. 
48 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
49 Id. 
50 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267. 
51 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
52 Id. at 317-368 (Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Citizens v. Perry.54 In 2003, the Texas Legislature redistricted after 
Republicans won the Texas House of Representatives, modifying the 
map made at the beginning of the decade to maximize Republican gains 
in Congress.55 While some Texas Republicans admitted that political 
gain was the sole motive, the Court again dismissed the claim of partisan 
gerrymandering.56 While at least five Justices on the current Court 
believe that a standard could be found, it seems like the most likely 
remedy for a political gerrymander will be at the state level. The 
Supreme Court has largely refused to intervene in political 
gerrymandering matters. 
III. REDISTRICTING IN FLORIDA 
A. Before Fair Districts 
Florida is in the peculiar position of being a swing state on the 
national level, but somewhat less competitive on a local level.57 While 
Democrats outnumber Republicans in registered voters, Republicans 
garner a super-majority in the State House of Representatives, and 
twenty-six out of forty seats in the State Senate.58 
Like in many other Southern states, Democrats traditionally 
controlled the Florida Legislature and elected most governors. But by the 
2000 election, their political fortunes had been reversed. Republicans 
controlled seventy-five of 120 House seats and twenty-five of forty 
Senate seats, putting them in the driver’s seat for the next redistricting 
process.59 After a largely partisan redistricting process, Republicans 
solidified their gains. Republicans were able to reduce “safe” Democratic 
seats in the House from 53 to 46 and Democratic “leaning” seats from 7 
to 3.60 By increasing the concentration of Democrats in safe seats, while 
spreading Republican voters into several safe seats, Republicans were 
                                                                                                         
54 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (explaining 
that the Texas redistricting effort was inherently suspicious because it took place during 
the middle of the decade and without any other compelling reason to redistrict). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 I would probably classify Florida as a “purplish” state. While President Barack 
Obama won Florida twice, only three Democrats have won a statewide election in Florida 
since 2000: Bill Nelson in 2000, 2006, and 2012; Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink in 
2006; and Obama in 2008 and 2012. 
58 See Devin Ombres, The Recent History of Gerrymandering in Florida: Revitalizing 
Davis v. Bandemer and Florida’s Constitutional Requirements on Redistricting, 20 
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 297 (2014). 
59 Id. at 312. 
60 Id. at 314. 
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able to protect their majority.61 Barring a wave election, it would have 
been nearly impossible for Democrats to win a majority of seats.62 The 
same patterns held true for the Senate and congressional maps.63 During 
the decade, only three congressional seats switched parties, and all 
switched back to the Republican Party by the 2010 Election.64 
Democrats challenged the maps in Martinez v. Bush 
unsuccessfully.65 The plaintiffs failed to prove instances of intentional 
discrimination or vote dilution under Section 2.66 Additionally, they were 
unable to succeed on their political gerrymandering claim, in part due to 
their inability to satisfy the demanding standards under Bandemer.67 
B. The Fair Districts Amendments 
Prior to the approval of Fair Districts, Florida’s constitutional 
requirements guiding the redistricting process were no more stringent 
than the requirements under the United States Constitution and the 
Voting Rights Act.68 With the approval of the two amendments in 2010, 
Fair Districts provided courts with a framework to apply for political 
gerrymandering claims. 
1. Adoption of Fair Districts 
Wary of partisan gerrymandering, citizen groups gathered signatures 
to put the Fair Districts Amendments on the ballot as Amendments 5 and 
6. Both Amendments passed with almost 63% of the vote. According to 
the chain of the Fair Districts campaign, the purpose of the Amendments 
was to require legislators to draw districts “that make sense 
geographically, and that are not rigged to achieve a political result 
(emphasis added).” 69 
The Florida Supreme Court, upon approving the Amendments for the 
ballot, stated that the overall goal of the Amendments was twofold: “to 
                                                                                                         
61 Ombres, supra note 58, at 317. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 316 (describing how Republicans were able to create another safe district in 
Congress). 
64 Id. at 321. 
65 Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D.Fla. 2002). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 598. 
69 See Steve Bousquet, African American Legislators Split on Changing Redistricting 
Method, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/leg
islature/african-american-legislators-split-on-changing-redistricting-method/1079561. 
Mrs. Freidin later added that her organization’s goal was to level the playing field in 
elections. 
2015] FAIR DISTRICTS FLORIDA 201 
	  
require the Legislature to redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism 
or discrimination, while respecting geographic considerations,” and “to 
require legislative districts to follow existing community lines so that 
districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped districts . . . are 
avoided.”70 
With the approval of Florida voters, Amendments 5 and 6 were 
codified in Article III of the Florida Constitution. Section 21 (a), 
codifying Amendment 5, reads: 
In establishing legislative district boundaries: 
(a) No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with 
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an 
incumbent; and districts shall not be drawn with the 
intent or result of denying or abridging the equal 
opportunity of racial or language minorities to 
participate in the political process or to diminish their 
ability to elect representatives of their choice; and 
districts shall consist of contiguous territory. 
(b) Unless compliance with the standards in this 
subsection conflicts with the standards in subsection (a) 
or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in 
population as is practicable; districts shall be compact; 
and districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing 
political and geographical boundaries. 
(c) The order in which the standards within sub-sections 
(a) and (b) of this section are set forth shall not be read 
to establish any priority of one standard over the other 
within that subsection.71 
Amendment 5 establishes limitations on redistricting in the Florida 
House and Senate. Its corollary, Amendment 6, is codified in Section 20 
of the Constitution, with almost identical language applying to 
congressional redistricting.72 These limitations add a more 
comprehensive framework to preexisting standards for the Florida courts 
to apply. 
                                                                                                         
70 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 636. 
71 Art III, §21(a), Fla. Const. 
72 Art III, §21(b), Fla. Const. 
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C. Applying the Standards 
Justice Pariente, writing for the majority in Apportionment I, 
provided the framework to apply Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. 
The Florida Supreme Court can only act if the Florida Legislature fails to 
follow constitutional requirements; the doctrine of separation of powers 
requires judicial restraint to avoid injecting the Florida Supreme Court’s 
personal views into a legislative matter.73 The Florida Supreme Court 
should defer to the Florida Legislature and not wholly disregard policy 
choices when those choices are not inconsistent with constitutional 
standards.74 
In analyzing the language of the Amendments, the Florida Supreme 
Court found that in cases where “tier-one” standards (sub-section 21(a)) 
conflicted with “tier-two” standards (sub-section 21(b)), the Florida 
Legislature should adhere to the requirements of tier-one before 
complying with tier-two whenever practicable or feasible.75 
1. Tier-One Standards 
The requirement that no plan be drawn to favor a political party or 
candidate is new to Florida, but contained in the laws of six other 
states.76 While federal gerrymandering claims require excessive or 
“invidious” intent, Florida’s Constitution prohibits any intent and applies 
to both individual districts and the entire legislative plan.77 Because the 
effects of a redistricting plan are predictable, the focus is on both direct 
and circumstantial evidence of intent.78 The effects of a plan, the shape 
of district lines, and the demographics of an area are all objective 
indicators of intent.79 The Florida Supreme Court can consider all of the 
evidence to reach such a conclusion.80 
                                                                                                         
73 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 606. 
74 Id. at 608. 
75 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 615. 
76 Id. California and Washington have these provisions in their state constitutions. 
Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Oregon have statutory restraints on such redistricting motives. 
Id. n.19. The Florida Supreme Court noted that previous instances of political 
gerrymandering were an “unfortunate fact of political life around the country,” but not 
illegal. See id. at 616 (citing Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1297 (S.D. Fla. 
2002)); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
77 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617. 
78 Id. at 617. The effects of a redistricting plan are predictable for several reasons. 
Legislators and consultants have access to advanced data that allows them to identify and 
choose voters. More voters tend to identify with political parties and ideological 
positions. They tend to be clustered in certain areas. Finally, these voters are relatively 
loyal to a political party and its candidates. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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Such unconstitutional intent can be inferred by a departure from tier-
two redistricting principles without other justifications.81 The Florida 
Supreme Court noted that a desire to maintain the integrity of political 
subdivisions, and compact and contiguous districts would undermine 
opportunities for political favoritism.82 Intent may be inferred when a 
district’s shape is bizarre without countervailing justifications.83 
Moreover, the manipulation of district lines to include or exclude 
incumbents’ previous districts or current addresses could prove intent to 
favor an incumbent.84 
Section 21 (a) is consistent with the provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act by preventing vote dilution and protecting the opportunity of a 
minority group to elect a candidate of its choice.85 The protection of 
minority voters may entail a modification of tier-two requirements, 
though only to the extent necessary.86 However, if a plan goes beyond 
what is necessary to avoid retrogression, it can be invalidated as an 
impermissible racial gerrymander.87 The Florida Supreme Court required 
a review of the 1) voting age population (VAP), 2) voter registration 
data, 3) voter registration of actual voters, and 4) election results 
history.88 The Florida Supreme Court rejected an argument that the 
minority population in districts should not decrease (retrogress), but 
instead, the above factors should be used in consideration to determine if 
the minority group was still able to elect a candidate of choice.89 
The last tier-one requirement is contiguity. The Florida Supreme 
Court defined contiguous as “being in contact, touching along a 
boundary or at a point.”90 If one point is isolated from the rest of the 
district by another district, or only touches at a common angle, it is likely 
to not be contiguous.91 
                                                                                                         
81 Id. 
82 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 618–19. 
85 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 618-19. These requirements are in Section 2 and 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, respectively. While Section 5 requirements were 
limited to covered jurisdictions, the minority voting protections here were extended 
throughout the entire state. 
86 Id. at 626. 
87 Id. at 627 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993)). 
88 Id. at 627. 
89 Id. The court held that legislature should not dismantle majority-minority districts, 
or weaken other historically performing districts. Id. In coalition or crossover seats, 
minority groups have the ability to elect candidates of choice, usually in conjunction with 
other like-minded groups of voters. See id. at 625. 
90 Id. at 628. 
91 Id. 
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2. Tier-Two Standards 
First, Section 21 (b) requires legislators to make an “honest and good 
faith effort” to construct districts “as nearly of equal population as 
practicable,” balancing other legitimate considerations, and following 
federal one-person, one-vote standards.92 
The second tier-two requirement is compactness.93 The Florida 
Constitution does not define the term, but the Florida Supreme Court 
interpreted it to mean geographic compactness by reviewing the shape of 
the district and by quantitative geometric measures of compactness such 
as the “Reock method” and the “Area/Convex Hull method.”94 The 
Constitution does not require the highest scores; some districts, such as 
the district enclosing the Florida Keys, are naturally not compact.95 
Additionally, this requirement may be superseded by other legitimate 
considerations such as to keep the boundaries of political subdivisions.96 
The final requirement under Section 21 (c) is to utilize existing 
geographic and political boundaries where feasible.97 Generally, such 
boundaries are utilized and keep communities of interest together.98 The 
Florida Supreme Court approved the House’s choice to prioritize county 
boundaries, while rejecting the Senate’s broad use of demarcations and 
roadways, criticizing the approach as rendering the constitutional 
provisions “meaningless and standardless.”99 
Overall, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the goal of the second 
tier requirements were to guard against gerrymandering, and to provide 
the Court with indicators as to how well the Florida Legislature complied 
with the tier-one formulae.100 The tier-two frameworks provide an 
objective starting point for analyzing challenges to the maps.101 Finally, 
the challengers to a redistricting plan should be able to proffer an 
alternative plan to achieve the same constitutional objectives to protect 
minorities without subordinating other standards.102 In other words, the 
                                                                                                         
92 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 630. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 634–35. The Reock Method, used by the Florida House, measures the ratio 
between the area of the district and the area of the smallest circle that could fit around 
that district. Id. The Area/Convex Method measures the ratio between the area of the 
district and the area of the minimum complex polygon that can enclose the district. Id. 
95 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 635. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 636. 
98 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 637. 
99 Id. at 638. 
100 Id. at 639–40. 
101 Id. at 640–41. 
102 Id. at 641. 
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failure to produce a more feasible alternative could highlight the 
difficulties in drawing such a district, rendering such a challenge moot.103 
D. The 2010 Redistricting Cycle 
Florida gained an additional two congressional seats after the 2010 
Census. Florida’s Legislature once again set out to redraw its 
congressional and state legislative districts. In early 2012, the Florida 
Legislature passed the new maps, which were signed into law by 
Governor Rick Scott. However, the redistricting process was not without 
controversy. 
Throughout 2011, the Florida Legislature held public hearings and 
committee meetings in what was supposed to be a transparent 
redistricting process.104 On the contrary, the redistricting process was 
scarred by the revelation of secret meetings and strategies between 
political consultants and legislators to conceal partisan intent behind their 
redistricting plans. The Florida Supreme Court in November 2014 
revealed emails that showed that consultants played a major role in the 
redistricting process.105 Several maps were created by consultants, but 
were submitted under the names of everyday citizens to avoid suspicion 
that partisan consultants created the maps.106 Moreover, the documents 
revealed some of the deliberations involved in the redistricting process. 
One email noted that they had to correct the maps to include the home of 
a Republican Senator.107 Another indicated that one plan would retire a 
long-serving Republican Congressman.108 Finally, the maps revealed a 
fundamental intent to redistrict for partisan advantage.109 One expert 
noted that it would be impossible to draw the warped districts without 
                                                                                                         
103 Id. 
104 See FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Special Session 2014A Congressional 
Redistricting, FLORIDA REDISTRICTING, http://www.floridaredistricting.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2015). 
105 See Brandon Larrabee, Redistricting Process Under Scrutiny, HERALD-TRIBUNE 
(Nov. 26, 2014) http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2014/11/26/redistricting-process-scrutin
y/. 
106 See id. 
107 See Peter Schorsch, Read Here: The Trove of Redistricting Documents the Florida 
GOP Sought to Keep Secret, SAINT PETERSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2014) http://www.saintpeters
blog.com/archives/167956. The documents are available at https://www.scribd.com/doc
/247933322/The-Redistricting-Documents-The-Florida-GOP-Fought-To-Keep-Secret. 
108 See Peter Schorsch, Read Here: The Trove of Redistricting Documents the Florida 
GOP Sought to Keep Secret, SAINT PETERSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2014) http://www.saintpetersb
log.com/archives/167956. 
109 See Schorsch PDF file, supra note 107, at 8. “I count 28 R seats, 29 if you were able 
to pick up the new Hispanic seat in Orlando.” 
206 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:189 
	  
such a bias; while another noted that the maps were the most biased that 
he had ever seen.110 
The approved 2010 maps did not differ much from the maps in the 
2000 redistricting cycle. In the Florida House, Democrats gained three 
safe seats, but lost two seats that potentially leaned Democratic.111 The 
Senate plan created an additional Republican-leaning district, while 
costing Democrats a safe seat.112 Additionally, the congressional map 
consolidated Republican gains in the past decade, bolstering some 
Republican seats.113 On the whole, Democratic seats were made more 
Democratic, and safe Republican seats slightly more Republican, so as to 
maximize safe Republican seats, protecting their majority.114 
E. Apportionment I 
Under the Florida Constitution, the Attorney General is required to 
petition the Florida Supreme Court for declaratory judgment within 
fifteen days of the passage of the apportionment plan, and the Supreme 
Court is required to enter judgment within thirty days of the petition.115 
On February 9th, 2014, the Senate passed Senate Joint Resolution 1176, 
apportioning the state into 120 House and 40 Senate districts.116 The 
Supreme Court, after holding oral argument, approved the Florida House 
map, but rejected several districts in the Florida Senate’s plan.117 
1. Challenges 
The Florida Democratic Party (“FDP”) and a coalition of groups 
including the League of Women Voters of Florida, the National Council 
of La Raza, and Common Cause Florida (“Coalition”) challenged that 
the redistricting plans violated the Florida Constitution. 
First, they argued that a statistical analysis of the plans revealed an 
overwhelming partisan bias in registration and election results.118 Voter 
registration statistics revealed that Republicans had an advantage in 22 of 
40 Senate districts and 61 of 120 House districts.119 Additionally, the 
Republican Governor would have won in 26 Senate districts and 73 
                                                                                                         
110 Paula Dockery, Fair District Amendments Make Impact. THE LEDGER (June 18, 
2014) http://www.theledger.com/article/20140618/COLUMNISTS0309/140619229. 




115 Art. III, § 16(e), Fla. Const. 
116 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 600. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 641. 
119 Id. at 642. 
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House districts despite winning only 50.6% of the two-party vote.120 
While the Florida Supreme Court held that these statistics might be 
depictive of a lack of political fairness, these statistics go to effect and 
not improper intent.121 In fact, Democratic voters tend to cluster in urban 
areas, creating a natural “packing” effect.122 Additionally, this imbalance 
could be the result of the required compliance with the Voting Rights 
Act.123 Finally, unlike states that encourage competitive districts, 
Florida’s Constitution does not require a balanced map, or proportional 
representation, but merely a neutral map without improper intent 
involved.124 
a. House Map and House District 
Analysis 
The Florida Supreme Court approved the plans for the Florida House 
without modifications.125 The court found no evidence of improper 
intent, and further, compliance with the tier-two standards was designed 
to serve as a bellwether for a political gerrymander.126 The challengers 
failed to find any retrogression in the overall plan or evidence of a racial 
gerrymander.127 Most districts were compact, and the few irregular 
districts were justified by compliance with the Voting Rights Act or 
natural geography.128 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court found that the 
House’s use of county boundaries whenever possible was a consistent 
and reasoned approach.129 
After reviewing the map as a whole, the Florida Supreme Court 
examined and approved the districts challenged by the FDP and 
Coalition. In some cases, tier-two formulae were not satisfied, but were 
justified by compelling reasons, foremost, preserving minority voting 
strength130. Districts 70, 88, 115, and 117 were all challenged for lack of 
compactness, while 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 115, and 117 were 
challenged for failure to utilize municipal boundaries.131 However, all 
these districts had large minority protections that warranted protection 
                                                                                                         
120 Id. 
121 Id. 




126 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 644–45. 
127 Id. at 645. 
128 Id. at 645. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 647–53. 
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from retrogression under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and tier-one 
of the Florida Constitution’s requirements.132 The Florida Supreme Court 
held that the Florida Legislature was limited in options in these districts, 
and the challengers could not redraw them without retrogressive effect.133 
 
b. Senate Map and Senate District 
Analysis 
While the Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida House made 
adequate efforts to comply with Florida’s anti-gerrymandering 
amendment, it found that the Florida Senate made little modifications to 
the partisan map in 2002, and ordered the Senate to modify its map.134 
The Senate plan as a whole demonstrated a clear pattern of 
unconstitutional intent.135 Incumbents were spared challenges against 
other incumbents, and were given large parts of their prior 
constituencies.136 Moreover, the Senate’s renumbering process benefitted 
incumbents to allow them to serve longer than the constitutional term 
limits.137 Furthermore, 70% of overpopulated districts were Republican-
performing districts used to shore up Republican support in these 
seats.138 Additionally, a number of districts had low compactness 
scores.139 Finally, the Senate’s choice of political boundaries was 
inconsistent throughout the map.140 
The numbering of a Senate district is critical because it determines 
the years in which Senate elections are held, and the eligibility of 
Senators for election.141 Under the Senate’s plan, odd-numbered districts 
were assigned to those senators elected to terms of two years or less prior 
                                                                                                         
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 653. 
135 Id. at 654. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 654. 
139 Id. at 656. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 657. See Art. III, §15(a-b), Fla. Const. Elections for Senate in odd-numbered 
districts are held in the years the numbers of which are multiples of four, whilst even-
numbered districts hold elections in the even-numbered years that are not multiples of 
four. Id. Additionally, the next election after a reapportionment, some senators shall be 
elected for two-year terms to maintain staggered terms. Id. Florida law limits the length 
of a legislator’s term by preventing those who have served in office for eight consecutive 
years from seeking re-election. Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 657. By adding the 
staggered two-year terms, most Senators could serve a maximum of ten years in office. 
Id. 
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to redistricting, and even-numbered districts assigned to those elected to 
four year terms prior to redistricting.142 In effect, almost every incumbent 
was given an opportunity to serve additional years, both frustrating the 
intent of the term-limits amendment, and advantaging incumbents as 
prohibited by the Fair Districts Amendment.143 
The Senate established District 1 in order to keep the coastal districts 
of Florida’s panhandle together.144 By doing so, however, it sacrificed 
compactness, and concerns for political boundaries, splitting five 
counties, and switching between different boundaries such as major and 
minor roads, and various geographical features.145 The Florida Supreme 
Court held that because compactness, a tier-two requirement, was 
sacrificed for a non-compelling need, the district was constitutionally 
invalid.146 
Senate Districts 6 and 9 are bordering districts in Northeast Florida 
that were challenged for using the minority voting protections as a 
pretext for partisan favoritism. The State proffered that the district was 
formed to promote minority-voting opportunities, but neither the district 
nor its predecessor contained a majority black population.147 The Florida 
Supreme Court sided with the challengers because their alternative 
District 6 was more compact, was wholly contained in Duval County, 
and preserved minority voting populations.148 Additionally, because 
District 9’s lack of compactness was the result of District 6’s 
configuration, it was unconstitutional as well.149 
                                                                                                         
142 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 661. 
143 Id. at 659–61. 
144 Id. at 663. 
145 Id. Senate District 1 had a Reock score of 0.12, where more compact districts are 
closer to 1. The Coalition’s alternative map only split one county in the Panhandle. Id. 
146 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 665. The goal to create an urban and a rural 
district could be a rational state interest, but other tier-two constraints such as equal 
population requirements, or to follow municipal or county boundaries would be more 
compelling. Id. The fact that both Districts 1 and 3 kept over 80% of their predecessor 
districts’ population was noted by the court and could signal an intent to aid incumbents. 
Id. 
147 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 665. 
148 Id. at 668–69. While the alternative district had a smaller black voting-age 
population (VAP), the Florida Supreme Court found that the district would be a 
Democratic-performing district, and that Black voters would control the Democratic 
primary, consisting of 64% of primary voters, affording black voters the opportunity to 
elect their preferred candidates. Id. It also was much more compact (0.32 Reock score). 
Id. 
149 Id. at 669. District 6 was drawn to take in Democratic neighborhoods, making the 
surrounding districts less Democratic. Id. Again, the districts retained most of the 
population from the 2002 map, which had no limitations on partisan gerrymandering. Id. 
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Districts 10 and 12 were challenged on the grounds of partisan 
favoritism.150 District 10 is fairly compact, but contains a 12-mile long 
appendage in between Districts 12 and 13.151 The appendage was on 
average only a few miles in width, and contained the home of an 
incumbent Senator.152 Because District 10 was visually non-compact, 
contained an appendage to reach out to encompass an incumbent, and 
could not be justified on the basis of protecting minority-voting strength, 
it was constitutionally invalid.153 
Much like District 1, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated District 
30 because it was non-compact, and split geographic counties.154 The 
Florida Legislature claimed that the purpose of the district was to tie 
coastal communities together, but the court invalidated the district 
because this interest cannot come at the expense of required 
constitutional standards.155 
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated Districts 29 and 34, 
in Southeast Florida, which had similar departures from compactness and 
political boundary standards that led to the conclusion of improper 
intent.156 District 34 was a 50-mile long, narrow district stretching from 
Northern Palm Beach County into Southern Broward County, slicing 
through neighborhoods and cities along the way.157 District 34 bordered 
to the north of District 29, and then traveled alongside its eastern 
boundary along the coastline.158 The Senate tried to justify compliance 
with minority protection by noting that District 34 had a 56% VAP.159 
Like Districts 6 and 9, the challengers submitted an alternative that was 
more compact and complied with minority protection requirements.160 
The Court concluded that District 34 was drawn to take Democratic 
                                                                                                         
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 670. 
152 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 670. In Senate floor debate, it was asked whether 
an incumbent lived in the appendage. See id. n. 50. The reply response indicated that it 
was unknown whether an incumbent lived in the appendage, though the incumbent was 
present at the debate. Id. 
153 Id. at 671. An appendage added to an otherwise compact redistrict can violate the 
requirement of compact districting. Id. (citing Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 45 
(Alaska 1992)). 
154 Id. at 672. 
155 Id. at 673. District 30 was described as an “upside-down alligator” and contained 
much of the same constituency as the former district. 
156 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 673. 
157 Id. at 674. 
158 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 674. 
159 Id. at 675. 
160 Id. at 674–75. District 29 had a Reock score of 0.15, while 34 had the lowest Reock 
score of just 0.05. Id. The challengers’ replacement map improved on these scores. Id at 
678. Additionally, the new map would also have a majority-minority district. Id. 
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voters out of District 29, creating a plan that made District 34 a 
competitive, Republican-leaning seat.161 It found that the lack of 
compliance with tier-two standards was designed for political gain.162 
The FDP challenged several other districts unsuccessfully.163 In these 
cases, the Court found that the shape of the districts was explained by a 
compelling interest, and that the challengers failed to meet the burden of 
improper intent.164 In Districts 4, 25, and 26, the FDP failed to 
demonstrate a method that would avoid splitting county lines.165 In 
Districts 15, 28, and 33, the FDP failed to show indicators of intent or 
departure from traditional redistricting principles.166 Finally, the FDP 
challenged that Districts 35 and 36, and 38 were over-packed with 
Democrats to dilute the Democratic vote in other districts.167 In both 
challenges, the alternative plan would result in retrogression while 
decreasing compactness.168 
2. Redrawing the Map 
Holding that Districts 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 29, 30, and 34 were invalid, the 
Court directed the Florida Legislature to redraw the districts in 
compliance with Florida’s constitutional standards.169 The Florida 
Legislature was not required to redraw the entire plan.170 The Florida 
Legislature convened for a special session to approve the maps in March 
2012, by Senate Joint Resolution 2-B.171 Once again, the Florida 
Supreme Court was constitutionally obligated to review the Senate 
map.172 However, this time, by a per curiam opinion, the revised Senate 
map was approved for use for the next election cycle.173 
a. Changes to the New Map 
The Florida Legislature modified parts of twenty-six of the original 
forty districts in their new plan.174 The FDP and Coalition again 
                                                                                                         
161 Id. at 675. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 679. 
164 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 679–80. 
165 Id. at 679. 
166 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 679. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 680. 
169 Id. at 685. 
170 See In Re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 2-B, 89 So. 3d 872, 
879–80 (Fla. 2012) (hereinafter Apportionment II). 
171 Id. at 880. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 881. 
174 Id. at 880. 
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challenged that the entire plan contained improper intent, but the Court 
found no new evidence of such intent.175 They also claimed that the 
Florida Legislature did not materially alter the previously non-complying 
districts when it re-drew the plan.176 
b. Unchallenged Districts 
The Florida Legislature made some changes to the first map that 
clearly complied with the new standards, so that the FDP and Coalition 
declined to challenge them.177 District 1 was redrawn to increase 
compactness while only splitting Okaloosa County.178 Additionally, 
District 23 (former District 30) became more compact, and took in much 
less of the former district.179 Finally, Districts 29 and 34 were redrawn to 
become more compact, and exhibited less partisan favoritism.180 
c. Challenged Districts 
The challengers alleged that District 8 was still non-compact, split 
counties, and was drawn to split the Democratic portion of Daytona 
Beach.181 District 8 contains much of the southern portion of former 
District 6.182 The Court upheld this district, holding that the Senate map 
was the most compact, and that ensuring population equality justified 
splitting the city of Daytona Beach.183 The Court also noted that the 
Coalition’s claim of partisan intent was weak in that the change had a 
minor impact on the district’s partisan balance.184 
                                                                                                         
175 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 882. 
176 Id. at 883. 
177 Id. at 887. 
178 Id. Former Districts 1 and 3 split five counties. New District 3 contains the entirety 
of eleven counties in the district. See District Maps, THE FLA. SENATE, 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Senators/Districts (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (displaying the 
approved Senate map). 
179 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 887. Former District 30 had contained 84.9% 
of the predecessor District; District 23 contained 59.8%. Id. 
180 Id. at 877–79. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 887. 
183 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 888. 
184 Id. In the Senate plan, and the proposed alternatives, redrawn District 6 remains a 
solidly Republican district, while District 8 is competitive during presidential election 
cycles; see Dorothy Hukill, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Dorothy_Hukill. Former 
Representative Dorothy Hukill won 57% of the vote in the 2012 Senate Election in 
District 8 and ran unopposed in 2014); see also 2014 General Election Active Registered 
Voters by Senate District, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 18, 2014, 10:13 AM) 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2014/GEN2014_CountyPa
rtySenateDist.pdf. Registered Democrats outnumber registered Republicans in this 
district by 1,828 voters as of the 2014 general election. 
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The Court approved Districts 10, 13, and 14 over challenges on 
grounds of compactness and that they favored incumbents.185 Old District 
10 contained an appendage; however the Senate concluded that it could 
not remove the appendage without impairing minority rights in bordering 
districts.186 Additionally, the new District 13 had little of its predecessor 
district, and drew two incumbent legislators together.187 
In new Districts 21 and 26, the Court found that challengers failed to 
establish violations with the new map, finding that county lines were 
followed, and the maps were relatively compact.188 
The Court approved the remainder of the map for the 2012 elections. 
Additionally, it approved of the Florida Legislature’s renumbering 
scheme, which assigned a lottery method for randomly assigning districts 
with odd or even numbers.189 
d. Concurrences 
Justice Pariente concurred, holding that the challengers failed to find 
constitutional flaws in the map, but cited barriers to the effective 
execution of the voters’ will. Justice Pariente found that time constraints 
made the fact-finding process more difficult, preventing the Court from 
testing the depth and complexity of the assertions made.190 The Court had 
a thirty-day window to review complex maps and had to clear the maps 
before the candidate qualifying period.191 
Next, Justice Pariente examined the “intent” requirement of 21(a).192 
Intent is separate from impact, and is a difficult inquiry, to be resolved 
using tier-two objective standards.193 Justice Pariente found no new 
evidence of improper intent, but suggested that potentially, a partisan 
                                                                                                         
185 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 888. 
186 Id. at 889. The elimination of the appendage would have meant that black voters 
would not have controlled the Democratic primary, making it less likely that minority 
voters could elect a representative. 
187 Id. New Districts 10 and 13 have performed Republican in 2012 and 2014 and 
Republicans have a 54% and 52% proportion of the voters registered to vote with the two 
major parties in these districts, respectively. District 12 is Democratic performing and 
Democrats have 69% of the two-party registered voters in this district. 
188 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 890. 
189 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 880; see also Mary Ellen Klas, Lottery Style 
Drawing Caps Strange Day of Redistricting Debate, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012, 
8:06 PM) http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/lottery-style-drawing-caps-strange-day-
of-redistricting-debate/1221212 (describing the lottery process, with the Senate President 
declaring the lottery the “most incumbent-neutral and random method that the Senate 
committee on reapportionment could devise”). 
190 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 892 (Pariente, J., concurring). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 895. 
193 Id. 
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imbalance could be used to invalidate an entire plan.194 With the burden 
of proof on the challengers, it is difficult to effectuate the majority’s 
standards, because any redrawing of lines will have political 
consequences, regardless of intent.195 To separate actual intent from 
alleged intent is a difficult task, indeed. Justice Pariente questioned 
whether the intent of the Amendment could be carried out with 
legislators in charge of redistricting, suggesting that an independent 
redistricting body could bring about the desired results.196 
Justice Perry concurred and dissented in holding that District 8 was 
improperly split, diluting black voters around Bethune Cookman 
University in Daytona Beach, in order to create two Republican 
districts.197 Justice Perry wrote that although a majority-minority district 
was not required, the district contradicts the requirements, allowing the 
Florida Legislature to split a minority group before it can reach a 
majority-voting bloc.198 
F. Florida’s Congressional Map 
Unlike Florida’s legislative maps, which are automatically subject to 
facial review by the Florida Supreme Court, congressional maps must be 
challenged as part of an as-applied challenge in a circuit court. 199 
In early 2012, multiple groups filed suit in a Leon County Circuit 
Court to challenge Florida’s congressional map.200 After a lengthy bench 
trial, in July 2014, Judge Terry P. Lewis found congressional districts 5 
and 10 to have violated the Florida Constitution, rendering the map 
unconstitutional.201 
                                                                                                         
194 Id. at 897 (Pariente, J., concurring). Justice Pariente suggests that defining a 
threshold would be very difficult. Perhaps this is similar to the challenges faced by the 
United States Supreme Court in Vieth. 
195 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 898. 
196 Id. at 897. 
197 Id. at 898 (Perry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
198 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 901. Justice Perry worries that approving 
District 8 would set a precedent that would make it difficult to challenge the district 
because it wouldn’t be “retrogressive” from that point onward. Additionally, he wrote 
that the new districts failed to follow consistent geographical boundaries. 
199 See Peter Schorsch, Judge Rejects Legislature’s request to dismiss challenge to 
Senate redistricting plan, SAINTPETERSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2013) http://www.saintpetersblog.c
om/archives/82626 (In as-applied challenges, circuit courts can consider the facts of the 
case as well as the law. The Florida Supreme Court does not handle as-applied 
challenges). 
200 These cases were consolidated to form Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA 000412, 
2014 WL 3797315, *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2014) (hereinafter “Romo”). 
201 Id. at *3-4. Judge Lewis held that the inquiry was into the process, end result, and 
motive behind the legislation. 
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1. Congressional Districts 5 and 10 
Congressional District 5 immediately failed the tier-two 
requirements as it was visually non-compact, bizarrely shaped, wound all 
the way down from Jacksonville to Orlando, featured an appendage into 
District 7, and followed few political boundaries.202 The Florida 
Legislature’s justification for the district was compliance with minority 
voting protections by creating a majority-minority district.203 However, 
the plaintiffs showed that a more compact district could have been drawn 
without being retrogressive; the last map had only a plurality black 
population.204 Nor was the population large enough or geographically 
compact for the Voting Rights Act to require a majority-minority 
district.205 Finally, the appendage into District 7 appeared to be drawn to 
favor the Republican Party by capturing the area’s minority 
population.206 Because of the failure to meet tier-two principles, and a 
finding of intent to benefit the Republican Party, District 5 was 
invalid.207 
While District 10 was mostly compact, it contained an appendage 
that wrapped under and around District 5.208 The Florida Legislature 
claimed that it was necessary to protect the minority voting protections in 
bordering Districts 5 and 9, but Judge Lewis found that it was 
unnecessary to avoid retrogressive effect.209 The appendage also 
improved the re-election odds for Republican incumbent Congressman 
Webster.210 Much like bordering District 5, a lack of compactness 
combined with unconstitutional intent rendered the district 
unconstitutional.211 
                                                                                                         
202 Id. at *16. According to the Florida Supreme Court in Apportionment I, appendages 
render a district not compact and should be avoided unless necessary to fulfill tier-one 
principles, mainly protecting minority voting strength. 
203 Romo, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 at *16. 
204 Id. The previous district also elected an African-American to Congress despite not 
having a majority-minority population. 
205 Id. Gingles requires that the minority population be geographically compact and 
cohesive; this district connects two distant urban populations and a black rural population 
connecting the two. 
206 Id. The proposed changes to District 7 decreased the number of registered 
Democrats in that district by 1%. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Romo, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 at *17. 
210 Id. The number of registered Democrats was reduced from 37.2% to 36.8%. 
211 Id. at *18. 
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2. Fixing the Congressional Map 
The Florida Legislature was ordered to withdraw the congressional 
map to fix Districts 5 and 10.212 Legislative leaders made slight fixes to 
the invalid maps and approved them to be sent back to the Leon County 
Circuit Court for approval.213 The map made changes in seven districts 
and attempted to make the districts more visually and mathematically 
compact and adhered to geographical boundaries.214 The legislative 
leaders noted the lack of partisan operatives during the new process.215 
However, the League of Women Voters claimed that the new plan made 
only slight alterations and would not correct the constitutional defects of 
the old plan.216 
On August 22, 2014, Judge Lewis approved the changes to the 
congressional map.217 The plaintiffs again challenged the districts, 
offering an East-West configuration in place of the new District 5, which 
went from North to South.218 The Florida Legislature’s changes did 
remedy some of the previous district’s flaws by becoming more compact 
and removing the appendage.219 Additionally, District 10’s appendage 
was removed.220 Because the new districts remedied the old maps’ tier-
two constitutional flaws, the Court had no choice but to accept the 
map.221 Because the map was approved so close to the 2014 elections, 
presenting legal and logistical hurdles, the Court held that the 2012 map 
would be used for the 2014 cycle.222 The plaintiffs appealed and placed 
the question before the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great 
                                                                                                         
212 Romo, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315 at *18. 
213 See Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Legislature Opens Session with Plan for Modest 





217 See Order Approving Remedial Plan, Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012CA-412, 2014 WL 
4261829 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2014). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at *2. 
220 Id. 
221 See id. (“My duty is not to select the best plan, but rather to decide whether the one 
adopted by the legislature is valid.”). 
222 Order Approving Remedial Plan, 2014 WL 4261829 at *1. Florida was one of the 
last states to complete the redistricting process, leaving little time for the circuit court to 
review the plan’s constitutionality. 
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public importance.223 The Court accepted jurisdiction and will hold oral 
argument on March 4, 2015.224 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FAIR DISTRICTS AMENDMENTS 
Did the Fair Districts Amendments to the Florida Constitution 
prevent the kind of nefarious partisan gerrymandering that they were 
designed to prevent? It’s certainly not an easy question to answer. First, 
although we now know that partisan operatives played a role in the 
creation of the maps, we cannot precisely decipher the actual intent of 
each boundary drawn, whether each district was created for political gain 
or for a more legitimate reason. The set of tier-two criteria provide a 
modest baseline, but a shrewd legislature can craft districts that satisfy 
tier-two criteria while preserving political advantage. Finally, 
gerrymandering is most effective in the aggregate; by creating a majority 
of favorable, non-competitive districts, the voting majority can guarantee 
that they have enough votes to pass a legislative agenda. The Florida 
Supreme Court and Leon County Circuit Court forced changes to the 
maps that made the affected districts slightly fairer. But the courts’ 
limitations to finding intent in the entire map constrained their ability to 
effectuate the intent of the Amendments. 
A. Intent vs. Effect 
As Justice Pariente noted in her concurrence in Apportionment II, 
challengers are limited by the burden of proving improper intent in a 
redistricting plan. As drafted, the tier-two requirements allow the Florida 
Supreme Court to examine intent. Additionally, the Florida Supreme 
Court can and should consider outside factors such as the role of 
consultants in the map-making process. But during the next redistricting 
process, consultants will likely make better efforts to conceal their role in 
the process. The Florida Supreme Court in Apportionment I held that 
while political effects could serve as objective indicators of intent, the 
Florida Constitution prohibits only intent, not disparate political 
effects.225 
                                                                                                         
223 See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D2079 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2014). 
224 League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, No. SC14-1905, 2014 WL 5502409, at 
*1 (Fla. October 23, 2014). The Florida Supreme Court will have the opportunity to 
apply the Fair Districts standards and perform a review of the congressional map. 
225 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617. Laughlin McDonald’s nationwide standard 
would include predominant partisan purpose and disproportionate electoral results as 
elements of an unconstitutional gerrymander; see also Laughlin McDonald, supra note 
46. Laughlin McDonald’s nationwide standard would include predominant partisan 
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While proportional representation is not required, disparate political 
effects should play a greater role in the finding of improper intent.226 The 
political impacts of gerrymandering are predictable to anybody with 
access to sophisticated political data.227 Moreover, gerrymandering is 
designed to create policies that favor a party and incumbents. The Florida 
Supreme Court should take a more extensive look at the political impacts 
of an entire redistricting plan and consider that improper intent may 
persist although tier-two flaws are fixed. A review of the redistricting 
plans reveals that the decisions of the courts did little to mitigate the 
political effects (and thus likely political intent of the legislature). 
There are drawbacks to adopting such an approach. The Voting 
Rights Act, and demographic clustering tend to skew electoral results 
away from proportionality. Incumbent success occurs nationwide, and 
even in states in which commissions control redistricting.228 The Florida 
Supreme Court considered this approach, and noted that redistricting 
inherently has political effects, benefitting one party over the other.229 
However, if the purpose of the Amendments was to level the playing 
field, a more extensive look at election results must be incorporated. 
B. Comparing House and Senate plans 
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the House map 
while rejecting the Senate map can be explained in part by the House’s 
                                                                                                         
purpose and disproportionate electoral results as elements of an unconstitutional 
gerrymander; see also Ethan Weiss, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 
53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 721 (2013). Ethan Weiss suggests adopting the Arlington 
Heights test, which looks at an unequal burden on one group, the historical background of 
the decision, the sequence of events leading up to the decision, legislative history, and 
other background circumstances. 
226 Proportional representation generally refers to a system where parties receive a 
number of seats based upon the percentage of the vote that they received. A party that 
wins 40% of the vote would win around 40% of seats. 
227 Political consultants, legislators, and even knowledgeable bloggers can easily 
estimate the political impacts of redistricting, and even create their own maps using 
online tools. 
228 See Devin McCarthy, Did the Cal. Redistricting Comm’n Really Create More 
Competitive Dist’s?, FAIR VOTE (Nov. 26, 2013) http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/blog/did-the-california-citizens-redistricting-commission-really-create-more-
competitive-districts/. Incumbents benefit from other factors including advantages in 
name recognition and political successes in bringing money and jobs back to their 
districts. 
229 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). The Leon County Circuit Court took a 
closer look at the role of partisan consultants, as part of an as applied review of the 
redistricting process. It also utilized some of the Arlington Heights factors as part of its 
review and as suggested by Weiss. 
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efforts to comply with Fair Districts, in contrast with the Senate’s effort 
to skirt the requirements. 
One commentator praised the House’s map as a “model plan,” 
although it would be extremely unlikely for Democrats to achieve a 
majority in this decade.230 Blogger Dave Trotter argued that House 
Republicans have “gotten smarter” allowing them to create majority 
districts that also complied with the constitutional requirements.231 Such 
a map is a reminder that a durable majority can be built without creating 
bizarrely shaped districts. Unless a court is committed to weighing 
partisan effects to invalidate an entire map, such a redistricting practice 
can likely survive Florida’s new constitutional standards. In other words, 
if a majority creates a map that complies with tier-two and minority 
protection requirements, it likely will be upheld. Such a redistricting 
strategy might be more effective than combating the constitutional 
standards directly, as the Senate tried.232 
While the House map was generally regarded as fair, the Senate’s 
map ignored tier-two requirements while protecting incumbents. But 
when Republicans were tasked to redraw the districts, Republicans made 
the districts look “nicer”, but the districts were “pretty much the 
same.”233 By fixing the constitutional defects in the eight invalidated 
districts, the Senate was able to preserve a map that had been produced 
with unconstitutional intent. 
Democrats under the new map would still have little chance at 
achieving a Senate majority.234 Even with heightened anti-
gerrymandering standards, the approved Senate map is not too different 
                                                                                                         
230 Dave Trotter, Understanding Republican Redistricting, THE POLITICAL HURRICANE 
(Mar. 22, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/03/22/understanding-republican-re
districting-the-district-45-project/. 
231 Id.; see also Kartik Krishnaiyer, Redistricting Saga: Senate Still Does Not Get It, 
THE POLITICAL HURRICANE (Mar. 18, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/03/18/r
edistricting-saga-senate-still-does-not-get-it/ (stating that the State House understood the 
mandate from the voters in a way that the Senate failed to grasp). 
232 See Fla. H. R. Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_House_
of_Representatives_elections,_2012. Democrats picked up 7 seats in the Florida House of 
Representatives in 2012, increasing their delegation to 45 out of 120 seats. 12 seats fell 
within a 5% margin of victory; see also November 4, 2014 Gen. Election, FLA. DEP’T OF 
STATE http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4
/2014&DATAMODE=. After the 2014 elections, Republicans increased their majority to 
81 seats. 7 seats fell within the 5% margin of error. 
233 Dave Trotter, New Senate redistricting plan out, GOP and incumbents with large 
advantages, THE POLITICAL HURRICANE (Mar. 17, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/
2012/03/17/new-senate-redistricting-plan-out-gop-and-incumbents-with-large-
advantages/. 
234 Id. Trotter writes that Democrats could peak at 15 seats, but likely end up with 14 or 
less out of 40. 
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from the gerrymandered 2002 maps that consistently produced a 
Republican majority.235 While Democrats hold a small advantage in voter 
registration statewide, Republicans would have an advantage in 21 seats 
under the court-approved plan and 22 seats under the old plan.236 
However, while Democrats hold registration advantages in these 
districts, Democratic candidates perform worse than their registration 
advantages.237 Under the old map, Democratic Gubernatorial candidate 
Alex Sink would have won 14 seats in 2010, and President Obama 16 
seats in 2008.238 Under the revised map, Democrats would be projected 
to pick up one more seat.239 
The districts unsurprisingly performed as predicted. In 2012, in a 
good year for Democrats, Democrats gained two Senate seats to reach 
14, ending the Republican supermajority, but still rendering Democrats a 
clear legislative minority.240 However, only one district was truly 
competitive, District 34, pitting two incumbents against one another.241 
The streak of incumbency continued into 2014, a year of Republican 
gains.242 Ten Senate seats were up for reelection, and incumbents won 
every seat by more than 15%, except for the District 34 rematch between 
Senators Sachs and Bogdanoff.243 Despite two disparate election cycles, 
only one Senate incumbent lost re-election over the two cycles, and this 
was in the only competitive district. Clearly, the purpose of the 
Amendments has been frustrated with almost unanimous incumbent 
success, limited competitiveness, and an almost guaranteed majority for 
the next decade. Given these results, the Florida Supreme Court should 
                                                                                                         
235 See The Prophet, Comment to Redistricting Saga: Senate Still Does Not Get It, THE 
POLITICAL HURRICANE (Mar. 18, 2012) http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/03/18/redis
tricting-saga-senate-still-does-not-get-it/ (noting that the 2002 districts were meant to 
elect 26 Republican Senators, and that the new Fair Districts standards produced a map 
that reflected a partisan gerrymander of the past). 
236 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 896 (Pariente, J., concurring). 
237 See Kevin Cate, Commentary: Fla. Democrats Should Change the Rules, Again. 
PALM BEACH POST (Nov. 16, 2014 3:27 PM) http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/
opinion/commentary-florida-democrats-should-change-the-rul/nh7QX/. This is because 
of lower Democratic turnout in non-presidential year elections, and Dixiecrats, 
conservatives who used to vote Democratic, but vote Republican for most major 
elections. 
238 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 896. 
239 Id. 
240 Id 
241 See November 6, 2012 General Election, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE http://election.dos.sta
te.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/6/2012&DATAMODE. 
Then-Representative Maria Sachs defeated Senator Ellyn Bogdanoff by 5.6%. No district 
was decided by a margin of less than 5%. 
242 See November 4, 2014 General Election, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, http://election.dos
.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/4/2014&DATAMODE. 
243 Id. 
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have been able to infer intent to protect incumbents and the Republican 
Party. 
The decision to invalidate eight Senate Districts was not 
insignificant. But the individual changes did little to shift electoral 
outcomes. The fixing of Districts 1 and 3 still produced two safe 
Republican seats.244 The alterations of Districts 6 and 9 produced a 
minority-performing district surrounded by safe Republican seats.245 
Additionally, old districts 10 and 30 remain Republican-performing 
despite becoming more compact.246 The fixing of the South Florida 
districts did produce an additional Democratic seat, preventing a 
supermajority. Old District 29 would have been a competitive, but 
Republican leaning seat.247 But after the Senate made 29 and 34 more 
compact, new District 34 became a Democratic-leaning seat.248 Given the 
shift in partisan demographics, it is likely that Democrats garnered an 
extra seat until 2022.249 In the end, the new Senate map created “nicer-
looking” districts, but only impacted one race. If voters wanted to “level 
the playing field,” then nicer-looking districts won’t cut it if incumbents 
and party control are protected.250 
C. Congressional Modifications 
Similar issues emerged from the decision to accept the Florida 
Legislature’s modified congressional map. In terms of fairness and 
                                                                                                         
244 See November 4, 2014 General Election, Districts 1 and 2 (old District 3) both have 
large Republican registration advantages and performance. 
245 Id. The modifications may have had a small impact on District 8 to the South, which 
is split evenly by voter registration, but performed for the Republican candidate in 2012. 
Id. Note that the Jacksonville-based minority opportunity district was renumbered as 9, 
and its old bordering district as number 6. 
246 Id. The appendage to avoid an incumbent versus incumbent battle turned out to be 
unnecessary, and both incumbents ran in different districts and got elected. 
247 Apportionment II, supra note 170, at 676. It would have voted 47.7% for 
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Alex Sink in 2010, and 48.7% for Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate Jim Davis in 2006. However, Obama would have won the seat 
with 51% in 2008. 
248 Anthony Man & Aaron Deslatte, Sens. Bogdanoff, Sachs in South Fla. Showdown, 
SUNSENTINEL (Apr. 27, 2012) http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-04-27/news/fl-senate-
redistricting-plan-upheld-20120427_1_bogdanoff-of-fort-lauderdale-maria-sachs-
republican-ellyn-bogdanoff. 
249 The shift from a district nearly equal in voter registration to one in which Democrats 
have a 56% share of the two party vote probably accounts for the margin between the two 
candidates. Sachs won by over four percent in a GOP-friendly cycle. 2014 General 
Election Active Registered Voters by Senate District, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 18, 
2014, 10:13 AM) http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2014/GEN
2014_CountyPartySenateDist.pdf. 
250 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 605. 
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incumbency challenges, the congressional map was fairer than the Senate 
map.251 However, a majority of incumbents have won re-election 
comfortably.252 The changes to the congressional map were 
insignificant.253 While District 5 became more compact, and lost some 
black Democrats to District 10, the changes only make a heavily 
Democratic district slightly less Democratic, and a moderate GOP 
district slightly less red, but clearly favorable towards Republicans.254 
Simply put, a slight modification cannot cure a map with improper 
intent. 
D. Competing Tier-One Requirements 
Most of what has been discussed, supra, involves the inference of 
intent from deviation from tier-two requirements. But some of the most 
difficult cases involve the creation of minority protection districts. While 
compliance with minority voter protections is required under the 
Amendments, conservative legislators can use these protections as a 
pretext to pack black voters into districts to “bleach” neighboring 
districts of black, Democratic voters. America’s history of suppressing 
the black vote makes minority protection a compelling interest, but 
where should a court draw the line between necessary protection and 
excessive packing for political gain?255 
                                                                                                         
251 November 6, 2012 General Election, supra note 241. Six incumbents lost primary or 
general elections during that span. Two more filled open seats. 
252 Id. Most incumbents won by comfortable margins overt the span. 
253 See Philip Bump & Aaron Blake, Florida’s Proposed New Congressional Map 
Looks Familiar, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/08/07/floridas-proposed-redistricting-redraw-looks-pretty-familiar/. 
254 Bump & Blake, supra note 253 (concluding that the redraw would not have a huge 
impact on the GOP’s majority in Florida or nationwide); see also supra notes 232 and 
241. Both incumbents won re-election in 2012 and 2014. District 10 was a 54-46 
Romney-performing district in 2012. Its black population increased from 10 to 12.2%; 
see also Fla. H. R. Elections, supra note 232; November 6, 2012 General Election, supra 
note 241. 
255 Richard H. Pildes, Is the Voting-Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Soc. Sci. and 
Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV 1517 (2002). Richard H. Pildes believes that 
coalition districts may be sufficient in terms of ensuring that minority voters can elect a 
candidate, because white voters are now willing to elect minority candidates at a higher 
rate; Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2011). Adam Cox and Richard T. Holden take 
a different approach, holding that the Voting Rights Act benefits Democrats more than 
Republicans in that it constrains Republicans from denying minority voters at least one 
representative. They hold that the “pack-and-crack” model is not the most efficient; see 
also Stephen Wolf, What if Legislators Didn’t Have to Draw Majority-Minority Dists.? 
Democrats Would Lose Big, DAILY KOS, (Mar. 09, 2014 1:59 PM) 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/03/09/1270976/-What-if-legislators-didn-t-have-to-
draw-majority-minority-districts-Democrats-would-lose-big (performing an analysis of 
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The issue of retrogression is tricky. If a minority population in a 
district is significant but not substantial (such as in District 8), the 
legislature in the next redistricting cycle will not have a high benchmark 
minority population, potentially hurting the minority’s chances to elect a 
candidate.256 On the other hand, a district with a high minority population 
could require that a subsequent district also contain a high minority 
proportion.257 For example Florida’s 5th Congressional District was 
required to stretch from Jacksonville to Orlando to come near to a 45% 
black VAP, because the benchmark district was a plurality district.258 The 
compliance with such minority voting protections can often overshadow 
partisan intent.259 Courts should thus be wary of underlying partisan 
motives behind the use of minority-protection districts. In order to make 
the right decision, the legislature must look at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine how much support the minority candidate 
would need to get elected. The Senate had several districts invalidated 
for not performing a functional analysis as to when to apply minority 
protection provisions.260 The Florida Supreme Court appears to be 
willing to invalidate districts if they are over-packed with minority voters 
and flexible on the non-retrogression issue. This seems to be a good first 
step in this part of the redistricting litigation. 
V. TRACKING THE SUCCESSES OF OTHER REDISTRICTING 
REFORMS 
Other states have intent-based prohibitions on redistricting. But the 
redistricting process in Florida is unique in that Florida allows its 
legislature to draw the lines, in compliance with constitutional 
constraints against incumbents helping themselves.261 Other states have 
                                                                                                         
redistricting without the VRA requirements and concluding that removing VRA 
requirements could cost Democrats 13 congressional seats, especially in the Deep South). 
256 This echoes Judge Perry’s dissent, worrying that the new map split Daytona Beach’s 
black population, cracking their vote into multiple districts. 
257 The new district would not necessarily have to have the same percentage, but would 
have to be drawn to avoid diminishing the minority’s chances of electing a candidate. 
258 See Romo, 2014 WL 3797315 at 10 The State’s expert testified that at 43.6% black 
VAP (voting age population), there would be a 50/50 chance of electing a minority 
candidate of choice. 
259 In cases where the legislature goes beyond what is necessary, and there is evidence 
of partisan intent, the district can be invalidated, as was the 5th congressional district. 
260 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 656. 
261 See Katie Sanders, Florida Holds the Record for Redistricting Incumbents Together, 
Will Weatherford says, POLITIFACT (Apr. 13, 2012, 2:37 PM) http://www.politifact.com/fl
orida/statements/2012/apr/13/will-weatherford/florida-holds-record-redistricting-
incumbents-toge/. 
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prohibitions against plans that favor a party or incumbents, but these 
states employ redistricting commissions in place of their legislatures.262 
For example, Iowa prohibits the use of incumbent address, political 
affiliations of voters, electoral results, and demographic information, 
except where necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act.263 But 
while these standards can serve to guide a redistricting commission, they 
play a different role where the legislature is a primary redistricting body. 
Since legislators have a personal interest in redistricting, it makes it more 
important to have stringent guidelines against gerrymandering. 
Some states allow redistricting commissions to take the process of 
redistricting out of the legislature’s control. Many academics believe that 
redistricting commissions produce maps that in appearance look fairer 
than those created by the legislatures. However, some academics note 
that redistricting commissions in the Western United States have not 
necessarily created more competitive seats.264 They have, however, 
created a more open and transparent redistricting process.265 It is 
important to contrast politically independent redistricting commissions 
from those that are dependent on partisan public officials.266 In Ohio, the 
political party appointing the majority of the apportionment board has 
seen gains in state legislative seats following each redistricting.267 In 
contrast, models such as California’s have helped limit legislative self-
interest and have produced districts that reflected local priorities.268 
In a survey, Nicholas Stephanopoulos found that margins of victory 
were lower, turnout was higher, and divergence between the overall vote 
and proportion of congressional seats was lower in the states that 
employed a commission model.269 Employing a commission model to 
                                                                                                         
262 Id. 
263 See IOWA CODE § 42.4 (6). 
264 See Grofman & Miller, supra note 1 (discussing Arizona’s congressional races, as 
mandated by the state constitution, have been competitive for a Republican-leaning 
state). 
265 Id. 
266 See Huefner, supra note 1 (Ohio employs a model where the Secretary of State, 
Governor, State Auditor, and two members appointed respectively by each major party); 
see also CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2 (In contrast, California’s 14-member redistricting 
commission is made up of California voters, selected through an application process, 
consisting of five voters from each major party, and four voters from neither party. 
Members are forbidden from holding public office, working for a public official, or 
lobbying for a certain period of time after being appointed to the Commission. The final 
maps require a vote of at least nine members). 
267 Huefner, supra note 1, at 42-43. 
268 See Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the Cal. Citizens Redistricting 
Comm’n, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 140 (2014). 
269 Nicholas Stephanopolous, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to 
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 340-41 (2007). 
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Florida redistricting would likely require an expensive political campaign 
and would represent a dramatic shift in our redistricting process.270 
However, most academics support statewide commissions as an effective 
shield for the democratic process. The gains in political responsiveness 
would justify the costs of running such a campaign. Alternatively, 
proponents could seek to amend the Florida Constitution to require 
competitive districts such as in Arizona, or to make the intent burden 
easier to satisfy.271 This would also require an expensive campaign, but 
would represent a positive shift towards greater electoral responsiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
The Senate argued that it would be a “Sisyphean” task to discern 
improper intent.272 Certainly it is not an easy task. But Florida’s Fair 
Districts Amendments make it unlike the cases of Bandemer and Vieth, 
which hold that political gerrymandering cases are not justiciable, 
because there are no standards to measure improper intent. In Florida, 
intent to favor parties is completely forbidden. There is a standard that 
the courts can apply. By assigning a greater weight to political effects 
and long term patterns, along with tier-two criteria, courts can more 
easily discover intent and effectuate the interests of the voters. Unless the 
system changes, certain constituents will not have a chance to have their 
voices heard. Instead, the majority will be beholden to the mapmakers 
and special interests that continue to get them elected as opposed to 
worthy policies that a potential majority of voters may support.273 In the 
end, the court must choose between the interests of the Senate and that of 
the voters who desire fair elections. In the meantime, Florida voters 
                                                                                                         
270 See Campaign Finance Database, FL. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS, http://election.dos.state.
fl.us/campaign-finance/contrib.asp#com. A key leader behind Fair Districts Florida noted 
that it could cost $10 million for such a campaign. The highest-profile ballot initiative in 
2014 was Amendment 2, which would have legalized medical marijuana in the state. The 
proponents, People United for Medical Marijuana raised over $8 million for their 
campaign. The opponent committee spent over $6.3 million. Additionally, the measure 
would have to pass with at least 60% of the vote, against a likely well-organized and 
well-funded opposition. 
271 See Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. 
Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Ariz. 2014) (jurisdiction postponed in 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014)) (A ruling 
against the Arizona Commission could jeopardize such redistricting commissions across 
the country). 
272 Apportionment I, supra note 22, at 617; see also Arizona State Legislature, 997 F. 
Supp. 2d at n. 22 (“A Sisyphean task is one synonymous with futile and endless labor.”). 
273 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631 (1993) Justice O’Connor found in Shaw that 
legislators would be sent a message that only the members of a certain group would 
matter, and not their entire constituency. 
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should elect people with ethics to the legislature who will comply with 
the constitutional requirements. This is probably easier said than done, 
however. 
Florida’s new constitutional standards add might to the Florida 
Supreme Court’s ability to strike the most obvious gerrymanders, and as 
Hebert notes, they are a significant improvement and protection for 
Florida voters.274 But the Florida Legislature continues to be trusted to 
protect the interests of Florida voters. The burden of challenging districts 
is high for a proponent to meet. And while tier-two principles mandate a 
map that is free from bizarre districts, compliance with tier-two 
principles does not necessarily mean that the map is free from partisan 
intent. The creation of safe seats, the near guarantee of a majority 
throughout the decade, and the near unanimous record of incumbent 
successes indicate that the maps may not be free of such illicit intent. 
Under the Fair Districts precedents, the courts can only do so much to 
stop partisan gerrymandering, denying the ability of the voters to elect 
their preferred representatives. This must change. Simply put, democracy 
is too important to allow legislators to pick and choose their own 
constituents. Such a practice is inconsistent with the theory that voters 
should be able to choose their representatives. 
In the meantime, we can only hope that our legislators have the 
morals to serve the people and not the mapmakers. 
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